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Abstract : In the present paper, we argue that the existing data collections fail to map specific
features of modern public administration in Switzerland, namely new modes of governance
with hybrid state structures. After presenting the Swiss federal administration in a nutshell,
we discuss the challenge of mapping hybrid state structures based on different studies
focusing on four different aspects: first, quasi-state bodies; second, joined up government;
third, emerging new institutions for problems not adequately captured by existing political
geography, most prominently seen in the case of functional urban regions; and fourth, new
modes of governance with co-production of public goods by state and non-state actors. We
then present newer studies and ongoing research (which could be coupled with the mapping
of public administration in Switzerland), namely the "agenda setting"-project, research on
independent regulatory bodies and, finally, the courts' impact on public administration. In
further conceptual work, we may discuss in more depth how the challenge of new modes of
governance and cooperative government can be addressed by focusing on the transformation
of state structures rather than by adopting a static view.2
1. Introduction
In the present paper, we discuss the question of how to deal with the phenomenon of "hybrid
state structures" in systematic surveys of public bureaucracy, based on experiences made in
the data collection for comparative policy analysis at different federal levels in Switzerland.
In Switzerland exist various attempts to systematically map public administrative structures,
the most important one is the BADAC (Banque de données sur les administrations cantonales
et communales) hosted at the IDHEAP (Swiss Graduate School of Public Administration) in
Lausanne. BADAC is a data base of comparative information and analysis on the
administrations of the Swiss cantons and cities. The bilingual (French-German) Website
describes the main characteristics of the structure and size of government, the political-
administrative organization (governments, parliaments, management and public policy), the
civil servants and their wages, the finances as well as inter-cantonal cooperation. The database
contains more than 600 variables and indicators, as well as a large number of downloadable
tables in Excel format. It is supplemented by survey data about the cantonal and municipal
administrations, collected by the BADAC, and by other official statistics. It offers numbers
possibilities of performing comparative analyses (benchmarking, monitoring, links,
organization charts) for the 26 cantons and 120 Swiss cities with more than 10,000 inhabitants
(including at the level of departments and services of the respective public administrations).
General overviews of the federal administration have been offered by Germann (1998) and
Varone (2007). The Swiss COBRA project is currently running at the IDHEAP by our
colleagues Y. Emery and A. Ladner (cf. Common Public Organization Data Base for
Research & Analysis; www.publicmanagement-cobra.org). The original survey will be
slightly adapted to the Swiss context and then conducted in agency-like organizations.
Specific questions related to political control, public corporate governance and public
management of agencies will be possibly added. Statistical analysis will be done, according to
previous exploitation of the COBRA questionnaire.
However, we argue that the existing data collections fail to map specific features of modern
public administration, namely new modes of governance with hybrid state structures are
difficult to capture in a comparative and systematic manner. While previous research
corroborates this fact, there are new projects under way that seek for ways of overcoming
these deficiencies. We will present the Swiss situation in the following manner:
In the next section 2, we will present the Swiss federal administration in a nutshell drawing
from existing work. In the subsequent section 3, we will discuss the challenge of mapping
hybrid state structures based on different studies focusing on different aspects: first, quasi-
state bodies; second, joined up government; third, emerging new institutions for problems not
adequately captured by existing political geography, most prominently seen in the case of
functional urban regions; and fourth, new modes of governance with co-production of public
goods by state and non-state actors. In section 4, we will present newer studies and ongoing
research on public administration, namely the "agenda setting"-project, research on
independent regulatory bodies, and, finally, the courts' impact on public administration. In the
concluding section 5, we argue that both conceptual implications of these experiences as well
as methodological lessons need to be further discussed (in order to inform the actual and
upcoming data collection).
2. The Swiss administration in a nutshell3
We begin our short presentation of the Swiss administration by sketching the outline of the
federal administration and its evolution over time. Attention is drawn to the fundamental
aspects of the ministerial structure of the administration. Furthermore, the importance of the
volunteer or civilian forms (the so-called “Milizverwaltung”) is underlined, as opposed to
professional forms of administration, such as extra-parliamentary commissions and quasi-
state implementation agencies (see Varone 2007 for more details).
2.1. The evolution of the federal administration
From a legal standpoint, the central administration consists of the Federal Chancellery and the
seven Federal Departments: the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs (FDFA), the Federal
Department of Home Affairs (FDHA), the Federal Department of Justice and Police (FDJP),
the Federal Department of Defence, Civil Protection and Sport (DDPS), the Federal
Department of Finance (FDF), the Federal Department of Economic Affairs (FDEA), and the
Federal Department of the Environment, Transport, Energy and Communications (DETEC).
These departments are made up of General Secretariats, Federal Offices and their respective
subsidiary units.
The decentralized administration consists of committees with decision-making powers,
certain independent authorities such as the Federal Data Protection Commissioner, Presence
Switzerland, the Swiss Agency for Therapeutic Products, and the Office of the Prosecutor
General of the Swiss Confederation, as well as autonomous firms and organizations.
i Due to
the federal process of implementation which is characteristic of the Swiss political system, the
framework of the decentralized administration also includes the cantonal administrations and
the dispersed services of the Federation, such as customs management.
Going beyond this formal distinction, the federal administration can be represented by a
model of four concentric circles. The model of concentric circles describes a vision of the
administration in terms of a central core in which politics clearly dominate and, as we move
away from the centre, we observe an increase in the influence of private market forces on the
administration.
1. The central administration, which carries out the roles of leadership, formulating and
coordination policies, and providing internal management services, makes up the essential
core. The General Secretariats of the departments, the Federal Office of Justice or the
State Secretariat for Economic Affairs are prime examples of core elements.
2. The second circle consists of those offices that are managed according to New Public
Management principles (the so-called Gestion par Mandats de Prestations et Enveloppe
Budgétaire, or “GMEB” -> "Performance contract"). The Federal Office for
Communications, the Swiss Federal Nuclear Safety Inspectorate and the Swiss
Meteorological Institute (MeteoSwiss) are examples within this circle.
3. Public agencies, institutes and firms that are wholly owned by the Federation, regardless
of whether they have an independent legal status, make up the third circle. This category
consists of a very mixed group of organizations, including the Federal Institute of
Intellectual Property, the Federal Institutes of Technology or the Federal Pension Fund
(PUBLICA).
ii
4. Within the widest circle, we find private or special-agreement companies in which the
Federation is the sole or majority owner. This category includes former monopolistic
public companies, notably the Swiss Federal Railways,
iii Swisscom
iv and Swiss Post.
v
These public service sectors have gradually been opened up to competition, and have (in
some cases) been subject to a transformation in terms of their legal and ownership status;4
RUAG
vi and Skyguide are examples of organizations that have become private
corporations.
In order to understand the evolution of the “borders” of the federal administration, Table 1
presents an inventory of the number of full-time permanent employees in the various
administrative units from 1975 to the present. The general federal administration, i.e., the two
central spheres described above, has been reduced to approximately 30,000 civil servants. In
contrast to the growth experienced during the period from 1945 to 1975, which is known as
the “Glorious Thirty”, the total number of administrative personnel of the Federation has been
in decline for the past decade; a similar trend can be found in the formerly public
corporations.
Table 1: Evolution of the workforce (full-time, permanent employees)
Unit/Year 1975 1985 1995 2000 2004
General federal
administrationa















40,487 36,785 32,661 CFF SA: 28,272 CFF SA: 28,351
a Since 2000, several administrative units from the third sphere are no longer taken into account, such as the
Federal Institutes of Technology.
Source: State Accounts 1995 (p. 278), 2000 (p. 280) and 2004 (p. 291) and annual reports of Swisscom SA, the
Swiss Post and the Swiss Federal Railways (CFF SA).
A similar trend can be found when examining the personnel costs of the general federal
administration, which have grown in constant Swiss francs (1975 basis) from 1.65 billion in
1975 to 2.01 billion in 1985 and 2.6 billion in 1995, only to drop to 2.05 billion in 2000 and
1.58 billion in 2004.
vii These major changes are the result, in large part, of successive waves
of administrative reforms.
2.2. Federal departments (ministries) and offices
The structure of the seven ministries of the federal administration appears to be as permanent
as the Churfisten string of seven mountain peaks in the canton of Saint Gallen (Germann
1996: 34). The number of (Federal Councillors leading the) departments has been set at seven
since the adoption of the 1848 Constitution. Switzerland has not experienced the kind of
restructuring, break-up or creation of governmental ministries which are typical to the arrival
of new governments in power in other democracies. The immutability of the seven
departments has nevertheless been subject to (ultimately unsuccessful) challenge on several
occasions, including the question appearing on ballots in 1900 and 1942. The opposition to
institutional change is not absolute, however, as several reorganizations have been carried out
in the distribution of offices across the departments.
The federal offices that are directly under the control of a department represent the real
“spinal cord of the federal administration” (Grisel 1984: 213). Given the steadfastness of the
departments, the evolution of state activities has taken place at this level, following the
emergence of the welfare State and according to the respective weight of various public
policies.
The distribution of offices across departments is thus no small undertaking. Should the
balance of responsibilities be distributed equally across the seven departments and thus across5
the seven Federal Councilors responsible for each department? Or should the responsibilities
be grouped along functional lines, grouping together complimentary policy fields? Or, from a
management perspective, should the primary concern be the governability of the departments?
These three approaches seem to form the basis of the organization and management of the
administration by the Federal Council, which carries out the distribution of “offices between
the departments according to the demands of management, the closeness of the links between
administrative tasks, and the political and financial equilibrium”.
viii
Nevertheless, the departments remain very unbalanced in terms of the number of employees
and personnel costs. Table 2 shows that the Department of Defence, Civil Protection and
Sports accounts for over 40% of the staff and budgetary resources, while the Department of
Finance takes up 25% and the other departments account for less than 10%. Of course, a
smaller size does not necessarily translate into less prestige or political weight, especially
when we consider the growing importance of the Department of Justice and Police or the
Department of Foreign Affairs. A contrario, the DDPS often serves as a kind of training
ground, given to the most recently elected Federal Councillor.6










FCh 195 0.65 23,860 0.76
DFA 2,930 9.77 266.746 8.55
DHA 1,978 6.60 229.636 7.36
DJP 2,377 7.93 283.660 9.09
DDPS 12,498 41.71 1,252.009 40.12
FDF 7,630 25.46 759.582 24.34
DEA 1,117 3.73 140.907 4.51
DETEC 1,271 4.24 164.401 5.27
Total 29,966 100 3,120.77 100
Source: my own calculations, based on the State Accounts 2004 (pp. 291–293).
The distribution of offices across departments is carried out in an ad hoc manner, rather than
as the result of any real planning or rational assessment of administrative capabilities or
policies to be implemented. The DHA thus appears to be a typical “mixed bag” ministry, an
assessment of which would be worth carried out by the yardstick of the tangible effects of the
RGA. If we compare the respective size of the workforces of the seven departments during
the last decade, the relative size of the DFA (5,4% in 1994 versus 9,8% in 2004), the DJP
(5.5% versus 7.9%), the FDF (18.1% versus 25.5%) and the DETEC (1.9% versus 4.2%) have
all increased significantly, whereas that of the DHA (22.2% versus 6.6%) dropped
dramatically, notably due to the shifting of the Federal Institutes of Technology and the
military hospital at Novaggio to the third sphere. The DDPS maintained a relatively stable
workforce (40.6% versus 41.7%).
It is also useful to compare the historical evolution of federal spending by task groups. The
main changes in terms of sectoral spending are related to national defence (from 34.7 % in
1960 to 9.2% in 2004), as well as in food and agriculture (from 12.3% to 7.8%), whereas
those related to social security (13.4% to 27.5%), traffic (from 5.9% to 14.8%), education and
training (from 3.6% to 7.8%) or to the protection of the environment and land-use planning
(from 0.8% to 1.5%) are increasing, although all at very different levels.
In addition to the structural inequalities between the departments and the areas regulated by
the federal State, we must now take a critical look at the “governability” of the ministries.
Limitations on the extent of the supervisory capacity, in terms of the number of subordinate
offices answering to one department head, would seem to be a sine qua non condition for
efficient management (Gulick and Urwick, 1937). In fact, the range of offices answering to
the departments remains quite high at times, despite the Huber Commission recommending in
1971 that the number of directly subordinate offices should be between five and seven. A
majority of departments had until recently a larger range of responsibilities, which grew
primarily in the 1980s (see Table 3). The DDPS has been subject to the reverse tendency,
despite its significant size, due to its use of the regrouping of offices that was provided for in
the LOA. In the 1980s, the DHA, which is by definition a diverse and varied department, was
also subject to reforms aimed at improving its governability, such as the regrouping of offices
responsible for science and research.7
Table 3: Services answering directly to department heads from 1928 to 2004
ix
Year/Department DFA DHA DJP DDPS FDF DEA DETEC Total
1928 1 7 6 15 7 6 3 45
1959 4 12 6 11 8 6 6 53
1980 5 14 8 7 13 7 7 61
1991 6 11 11 7 11 8 7 61
2001 5 11 11 7 10 8 9 61
2005
x 6 11 9 7 11 8 9 61
Sources: Germann (1996: 49) for the years 1928 to 1991 and “La Confédération en bref” for the years 2001 and
2005. My own calculations for 2004, based on the list of federal administrative units contained in
OLOGA (RS 172.010.1).
3. Challenges to the mapping of public administration: previous experiences
There have been several research endeavors aiming at mapping specific aspects of
administrative organization. All of these projects have shown the limits of the existing data
bases and exhibited challenges for the realistic mapping of bureaucratic structures in
Switzerland. These challenges regard, first, quasi-state bodies and the Swiss Milizverwaltung,
second, the question of joined-up responsibilities of various units for the same tasks, third, the
newly emerging institutions in functional urban regions, and fourth, the co-production of
public goods by state and non-state actors. In the following, we will present the respective
parts of these research projects and derive the challenges for further research.
3.1 The “Milizverwaltung”: extra-parliamentary commissions and quasi-state organs
The Federal Council and the departments are also able to consult organizations or persons
outside of the federal administration
xi by creating, for example, extra-parliamentary
commissions. These commissions take over certain responsibilities, either temporarily or
permanently, from the Government, a department or an office. Their function consists of
making recommendations and preparing projects (consultative commissions or
Verwaltungskommissionen), which is the case, for example, for the Federal Commission on
Medicine, or making binding decisions (decision-making commissions or
Behördenkommissionen), as in the case of the Competition Commission.
xii
The composition of the expert commissions should be representative of the general population
and of the interest groups active in the domain under consideration.
xiii A detailed study of 373
extra-parliamentary commissions active in 1978 (Germann 1981, 1985) showed that, among
the 5,376 seats within commissions, 20% went to civil servants, 20% to cantonal and
municipal representatives, 22% to representatives of private or mixed companies, 18% to
professional associations, 11% to university professors, with other categories making up the
remainder. These bodies are thus a place for encounters, exchange and negotiation between
public and private actors, between the federal State and the cantons and, finally, between
scientists and politico-administrative decision-makers.
The vast network of extra-parliamentary commissions that have been institutionalized
represents a true “Milizverwaltung”, or “volunteer administration” for the Federation
(Germann 1981, 1985). The members of these bodies participate on a part-time basis and do
not receive payment for their services on a level equal to the salaries of employees of the
administration. Nevertheless, these volunteer structures take the place of a Weberian
administration, such as the Federal Banking Commission, or at the very least form a8
complement to the administration, such as the Federal Commission for AIDS. The list of
commissions, maintained by the Federal Chancellery, attests to the fact that there is no
department that does not make use of such services, although the distribution across domains
varies significantly.
Table 4 presents an inventory of extra-parliamentary commissions narrowly understood, as
well as appeal commissions (e.g., the Federal Commission for Data Protection),
representatives of the Federation (e.g., Swiss Tourism) and the leadership organs (e.g., Swiss
National Commission for UNESCO) that are also responsible for general interest
assignments. Consultative commissions are the most numerous. Taking into consideration all
types of extra-parliamentary commissions, nearly half of all commissions are based in the
DHA.
Table 4: Extra-parliamentary organs appointed by the Federal Council in 2005
xiv
Type of organ /
Department
FCh DFA DHA DJP DDPS FDF DEA DETEC Total
Consultative
Commissions






































Sources: List provided by the Federal Chancellery (as of November 2005).
This volunteer administration has raised and continues to raise a number of questions, both
political and scientific. The fundamental question that underlies these debates is whether or
not the commissions represent a shift in legislative power from the political sphere to these
pre-parliamentary organs. In effect, if these represent the de facto locations where
compromises between the various parties involved in the formulation of a public policy are
being reached, then these extra-parliamentary commissions are doing much more than simply
providing a source of expertise and advice. Through their role as intermediaries between the
interest groups who are represented within them, the commissions have a decisive impact on
the form of the compromise solutions that emerge. A number of parliamentary reports and
speeches have raised questions concerning the costs and weak results of the extra-
parliamentary commissions, as well as the ability of this volunteer administration to create, at
an early stage in the decision-making process, a compromise that the Federal Council and
Parliament can rarely modify at a later stage. This critique of the defining and framing power
of the commissioners also underlines the manner in which certain private actors have
appropriated the consultation procedures managed by the federal administration.
In terms of the function of implementing political decisions, we should note that there are a
number of quasi-state bodies that play an important role in this respect within Switzerland.
The various private organization, mixed-ownership companies and associations having the
most hybrid of statuses represent another hidden side to the iceberg.
By 1979, the Financial Authority had already identified the presence of 189 quasi-state
organizations with more than 11,000 personnel that operated in accordance with federal
sovereignty, received more than CHF 730 million in subsidies, or enjoyed guarantees against9
deficits. A number of studies on the decision-making process in Swiss democracy (Linder
1988) have also shown the growing influence of quasi-state administration, for example
professional associations in the education sector and producer associations in the field of
agricultural policy.
In brief, an important “intermediary zone” (Germann 1987) stretches out to cover the centre
of the continuum between public administration and private organizations. The diverse
institutions which make up this zone, and which provide services of general interest at both
the pre- and post-parliamentary stages, constitute a very complex system, our knowledge of
which remains incomplete. Many questions concerning the representativeness of their compo-
sition, the efficiency of their activities and their role in the connection between interests and
the decision-making process remain largely unanswered to this day.
3.2 Joined up government and shared competences
Switzerland has a political system of power sharing government at all federal levels. As a
consequence, the allocation of departments is less substantially than politically driven. For
administrative organization, joined up government and the shared responsibility of two or
more units of the same administration for one task or group of tasks is the result. This causes
measurement problems that can be illustrated with two cases, the one at the federal level
(Vatter et al. 2000), the other at the cantonal level (Sager 2003).
Vatter et al. (2000) is a commissioned study by the Federal Department of External Affairs to
capture and assess the various Swiss activities in peace promotion. Goal was to ameliorate the
coherence of Swiss peace policy. To this end, the authors undertook a vast survey among 43
different federal services in four of the seven federal departments. The survey was in the form
of a matrix in order to identify which goals were pursued with what means and in
collaboration with which other federal services. The finding was that almost all 43 services
shared the same six general goals and partly used the same or similar policy instruments, but
did so in a much uncoordinated manner beyond the organizational borders of their respective
departments. The cause of policy incoherence was the politicized distribution of tasks and the
recommendation was the limitation of the departmental discretion (which by the way was the
reason why the report was so passionately attacked by chief officers that it finally was buried
in the desk). As for the question of mapping public administration, the implication of our
study is that is almost impossible to identify the workforce active in a specific policy field and
that respective numbers only with great caution can be derived from formal bureaucratic
organization.
This finding was corroborated in a study on cantonal alcohol prevention policy (Sager 2003).
The aim was – among other information – to compare cantonal investing in alcohol
prevention policy and explain these differences. However, the problem started with the
identification of the relevant workforce. First, cantons are autonomous political systems with
their own administrative organization. So, a standardized survey was a problem from the
beginning. Second, many tasks in the policy field were spread over various different
departments such as Police/Security, Justice, Public Health, Education, Economy and even
Transport. What started as a standardized survey became a very laborious work of picking up
pieces and putting them together. In the end, it was not possible to make a statement about
budgets, but we had a lot of information about the organization and the policy instruments of
cantonal alcohol policy. The result is a fundamental mistrust in figures on costs of public10
action as our experience showed that in the case of joined up government, respective numbers
are almost impossible to gain.
The two examples emphasize the difficulty in collecting data on administrative workforce
dealing with the same policy.
3.3 Functional urban regions and new “administrative scale”
Switzerland at the beginning of the 21st century is a service based economy and a highly
urbanized country. According to the 2000 population census, 73.3% of the population
nowadays lives in cities or communes within metropolitan areas. However, pressures and
problems resulting from this urbanization process have been ignored for a long time.
In spite of increasing territorial interconnectedness, the institutional structure of Switzerland
has virtually not changed since the beginning of the 20th century. As far as the communal
level is concerned, annexation of suburban communes by major cities has occurred between
1893 and 1934. The most significant of these annexations took place in Zurich (1893: eleven
suburbs; 1934: eight suburbs), Winterthur (1922: five suburbs), St. Gallen (1918: two
suburbs) and Geneva (1931: three suburbs). Back then, suburban communes with feeble
resources agreed to amalgamate with prosperous cities that lacked space for further
development. After 1934, such amalgamations have been very rare or were not significant in
terms of population or surface. Indeed, most suburban communes were able to consolidate
their economic basis, whereas core cities ran into financial difficulties due to the loss of
wealthy taxpayers during the phases of sub- and peri-urbanisation. Since communes have to
agree to amalgamation and cannot simply be obliged to do so by higher state levels , this
configuration is an obstacle to territorial reform in most urban areas: rich suburban communes
ferociously oppose any step towards annexation by financially distressed core cities (Geser
1999: 426). Only the extraordinarily wealthy city of Lugano managed, in 2004, to annex eight
suburbs, thereby almost doubling its population. Similarly, the territory of cantons - the
intermediate territorial level between communes and the Swiss Confederation - has not
witnessed major change since the mid 19th century. Cantons as the federate states are the
constitutive entities of Swiss federalism and the formal hurdles to changing cantonal
boundaries are so high that they are almost impossible to implement (Germann 1999: 397).
Finally, the creation of regional institutions (i.e. situated between the communes and the
cantonal level) during the 1970s has been limited to peripheral mountainous regions in order
to improve infrastructure for economic development.
Hence, unlike most other Western European Nations Switzerland has seen no significant
reform of its institutional territories during the 20th century, and the likeliness of such a
reform to come about in the near future is very small. As a consequence, institutional
fragmentation of urban areas is high in Switzerland. Unlike most other European countries,
there is however no institution whereby cooperation could be enforced: metropolitan areas are
the ‘lost dimension in Swiss federalism’ (Linder 1994: 77). Reforms of territorial institutions
in metropolitan areas are highly unpopular (Kübler et al. 2001), and in the absence of such
reforms, voluntarism is the only path through which area-wide governance can be achieved in
Swiss metropolitan areas (Sager 2005).
Indeed, surveys on local government activities have shown that the importance given to
policy-oriented cooperation among local authorities in metropolitan areas has increased11
during the 1990s (Ladner et al. 2000), as a response to increasing urban sprawl. Focusing on
horizontal cooperation between communes, a survey conducted in 16 large and mid-sized
metropolitan areas found 444 mechanisms of purpose-oriented inter-communal cooperation,
i.e. more than two dozens for each metropolitan area (Arn and Friederich 1994). In terms of
policy fields, these cooperational structures are most important in land use planning,
transport, environmental protection, but also energy and water supply, waste disposal, cultural
institutions, social welfare, etc. There is a wide variety of legal forms: legal entities,
associations established under private law, cooperatives, joint-stock companies, inter-
communal associations under public law, as well as public- and private-law foundations. Not
only horizontal cooperation between communes, but also vertical intergovernmental
cooperation has become more and more important for metropolitan policy making (Schenkel
and Güller 2000). Cantons and in some cases even the Confederation are also often associated
to purpose-oriented co-operational arrangements, especially so in the fields of land use
planning, transportation, and environmental protection. Here too, there is a great variety of
forms, ranging from discussion platforms, over consultative commissions to formal
organizations charged with implementing a particular service. In any case, public-private
partnerships are very frequent in Swiss metropolitan governance: since non-governmental
agencies are not bound to any particular territory they can execute area-wide public tasks
more flexibly. In addition, through project-based financial contracts, governmental partners
can easily get involved with a non-governmental agency - therefore offering an easy way to
achieve single-level or even multi-level intergovernmental cooperation. There is even
evidence that non-governmental agencies have become the main vectors for the emergence of
a truly regional scope in some areas of metropolitan policy-making.
Thus, metropolitan governance in Switzerland basically results from horizontal, as well as
vertical cooperation between existing institutional entities, sometimes with significant
involvement of non-governmental actors. The new administrative structures that emerge from
these institutional changes in the political organization of functional urban regions (Nahrath
and Varone, 2007) form a challenge to systematic data collection. In the BADAC, the need
for the consideration of city regions has been recognized, however, so far the respective data
only provide information on the core city administrations. The joined up-provision in
cooperative inter-municipal arrangements is not mapped so far. The challenge for surveys is
just the greater as some of these inter-municipal arrangements cross cantonal borders and
unite again administrations from different cantonal subordinate systems.
3.4 New modes of governance: co-production of public goods by public administration
and private actors
As seen above (in 3.2), the political field of alcohol prevention policy is regulated with
singular inconsistency, since the cantons, i.e. the middle federal rung in the Swiss state
structure, are equipped with very extensive programming and implementation competencies,
leading to a pronounced heterogeneity and correspondingly interpretable statistic variance in
cantonal prevention efforts (Sager 2003). Another problem in the mapping of public
administration that can be illustrated with this data is the case of new modes of governance
with co-production of public goods by state and non-state actors (Sager 2007, 2008).
Governance structures are understood as networks of various types of public and private
actors addressing the same problem. The definition of governance structures as networks
embracing both public and private actors means that the mere outsourcing of tasks without12
communication structures between commissioning agency and mandatary is not considered to
be a governance structure.
Based on two major surveys of the Swiss cantons conducted in 1999 and 2004, the strength of
governance structures in a canton's alcohol policy domain is measured in terms of the
question of who is the most important decision maker in terms of both strategic and operative
decisions. That is, for analytical reasons, we apply Osbourne and Gaebler's (1992) distinction
between "steering" and "rowing", but without acknowledging their normative claim that
governments should "steer, not row." Both levels of policy decisions are expected to be
important because both decisions can be delegated to governance actors while only a part of
the chosen instruments can be implemented by all actors, namely those instruments that are
not coercive and do not rely on state power. For the U.S., Hall and O’Toole (2000) found that
the importance of governance structures for policy implementation has not changed much
over time. We asked with regard to both strategic and operative decisions whether they are
taken by the public administration, the executive, the legislature, whether they take place in
informal governance structures (i.e. networks of various types of public and private actors
addressing the same problem) or whether the tasks are outsourced to external organisations in
a one-way manner without interaction between commissioning agency and assigned
organisation. The respective replies were subsequently coded dichotomously, which allowed
for multiple counting in cases in which it was not possible to clearly distinguish the
importance of different types of actors. Tables 5 and 6 present the respective data.




Public Administration 12 AR, BE*, BL, BS, GR, LU, NW, OW; SG, TI, VD, ZG
Executive 1 AG
Legislature 1 BE*
Governance structures 12 AI, FR, GE, GL, JU, NE, SH, SO, TG, UR, VS, ZH
External organisations 1 SZ
*Bern double counted




Public Administration 9 AI, AR, BL, BS, NW, OW, TI, ZG, ZH
Governance structures 4 AG, GE, JU, LU
External organisations 12 BE, FR, GR, NE, SG, SH, SO, SZ, TG, UR, VD, VS
Glarus: missing
The cantonal data shows that while public agents and governance actors play a decisive role
to the same degree on the strategic level, it is mainly the mandated external organisations that
are the key actors on the operational level. As for the remainder, in the majority of the
cantons, public administration bodies implement the policies, while in four cantons,
governance networks encompassing both public and private actors dominate operative
decisions. Cantonal legislatures and executives play a very minor role, in that in only one
canton in each case are they the most important actors regarding the strategy, while they are
not decisive on the operational level in any of the cantons.13
4. New approaches to the mapping of public administration: current research
Having identified challenges to the systematic mapping of public administration, we present
three projects which could party address theses issues and, furthermore, which could be
coupled to the mapping of public administration: first, the agenda setting project, second,
research on independent regulatory agencies, and third, a project on judicial reform.
4.1 Transformation of public administration and “policy punctuations”
In order to assess the transformation of public administration we may also draw upon
Baumgartner & Jones’ theory of punctuated equilibrium. Bryan Jones and Frank Baumgartner
consider policy change to be a matter of agenda-setting. A crucial condition for policy change
is political issue attention. An issue must be put on the political agenda, it has to attract
resources (e.g. time, money, expertise) before any policy change is possible (Jones and
Baumgartner 2005). In their longitudinal agenda-setting analysis of the functioning of the
American political system, these authors show convincingly that, in contrast to the classic
thesis of the incrementalist approach (Lindblom 1959), policy change does frequently happen
in the US (Baumgartner and Jones 1993).
Dramatic changes -- they call these policy punctuations -- alternate with long periods of
stability. Thus, sometimes, sudden sweeping movements challenge closed sub-systemic
politics: policy monopolies collapse, high politics gets temporarily heavily involved until the
policy domain at stake is contracted out again to a small group of experts and stakeholders; a
new policy monopoly gets established. The main reason for the changeability of (American)
policies is the availability of many policy entrepreneurs (Kingdon 1984) and, even more
important, the presence of a lot of institutional policy venues that can be used to sell an
alternative policy image to. Policy venues are institutional arenas were decisions on an issue
can be taken. Policy images are policy communities’ shared ideas about the policy at stake.
They explain what the issue is about, how it should be seen and which solutions are
appropriate. Venues and images are coupled. Policy change, essentially, happens when a new
policy image finds receptive ground in a new policy venue and the old venue looses control
over the issue, leading to issue expansion.
Policy punctuations can be initiated by several factors, one of which are so-called focusing
events. These external shocks, policy analysts agree, highlight policy deficiencies. They may
directly challenge the existing policy image and the venue that promotes it. Consequently
these external shocks may lead to grand changes (see also Hall 1993; Sabatier 1988; Sabatier
and Jenkins 1993). Birkland ascertains that focusing events, under specific conditions, lead to
the most drastic policy changes we observe in reality. Such events are defined along five
dimensions: they are sudden, uncommon, harmful, concentrated on a particular geographical
area or community of interest, and known to policy makers and the public simultaneously
(Birkland 1998). Thus, the media coverage of these focusing events immediately highlights
obvious harms for specific publics. The evidence of the damage done by external events is
“focal” in the sense that government may respond by putting a new policy issue on its agenda
or by modifying previous policies (e.g. the public administration in charge of the policy
implementation). Naturally, focusing events do not mechanically lead to policy changes: the
impact of external events on politics and policies depends upon the media coverage and social
mobilization (external pressure) and upon political actors’ position within the policy domain
(internal response). One might expect agenda-setting and policy change after a focusing event14
if the nature and harms done by the event are visible, if a community of interest is mobilized,
and if this community can instrumentalize this event to put forward its own values, beliefs,
and interests.
Relying on the agenda-setting approaches of both Baumgartner & Jones’ (1993, 2005) and
Birkland (1998), one research hypothesis to explain the transformation of public
administration could read as follows: If a focusing event strongly increases public and
political attention for a policy issue, then it will modify the dominant policy image and create
new policy venues and, consequently, it will translate into a major policy change and a
transformation of the public administration in charge of this policy. Of course, several other
hypotheses can be formulated on the impact of issues attention by the media, political parties,
new social movements, etc. on the transformation of public administration.
In the punctuated equilibrium approach, policy change is normally measures through two
formal outputs of the decision-making process: the number and content of passed bills on the
one hand, and the relative part of the yearly budget dedicated to a specific policy on the other
hand. Furthermore, a major policy change is defined as the formulation of a new policy
paradigm, objectives, instruments and implementation arrangements institutionalized by laws,
and as an increase of the financial resources that goes beyond the traditional incrementalism
of public expenditures (Hall 1993; Sabatier 1988; Sabatier and Jenkins 1993). Minor or
intermediate policy changes, on the contrary, are limited to the modification of the settings of
policy instruments and implementation arrangements, without inducing a dramatic shift in the
policy paradigm or in financial resources. In all cases, the transformation of public
administration could be used to identify and measure policy changes.
The work of Baumgartner and Jones (1993) has not only shaped the theoretical development
of agenda-setting studies but also very much the methodological approach. Instead of case
studies, which dominated agenda-setting studies before, agenda-setting studies have
increasingly been based on systematic quantitative coding of agenda content. Baumgartner
and Jones started out by content coding hearings in the US Congress over decades using a
coding system with more than 200 categories. The dataset that came out of this was unique as
it for the first time made it possible systematically to trace over time how scarce attention
within an institution is allocated among scores or hundreds of different issues. This approach,
which has since been extended to other political activities such as Congressional bills, State of
the Union addresses, and other data resources in the American “Policy Agendas Project,” has
now become a standard data source for the study of American politics (see
www.policyagendas.org). Using content coding of large number of political activities has
since become the standard within quantitative agenda-setting studies as it has opened many
new ways of studying agenda-setting processes beyond case studies even as the systematic
data allows for the combination of qualitative and quantitative approaches as well. For
instance, the interaction between different agendas can be studied statistically the distribution
of change across the different content categories has been used to evaluate the “punctuated
equilibrium model” (Jones & Baumgartner 2005), and the approach also makes systematic
cross national comparisons of issue evolution over time possible (Baumgartner, Green-
Pedersen & Wilkerson 2006).
To map the (evolution of the) Swiss public administration, we may share the same theoretical
and methodological perspective as briefly laid out above. As a matter of fact, we are currently
leading an ambitious research project on agenda-setting in Switzerland for the period 1978-
2008 (Varone et al. 2007). We are coding how various policy issues attract attention of the15
federal government (e.g. bill proposal, press releases, etc.), the parliament (e.g. parliamentary
motions, passed laws, etc.) and how policy actors mobilize direct democratic devices (such as
the optional referendum and the popular initiative) to put an issue on the political agenda.
This database could easily be coupled with a new database on public administration (at the
federal level at least). Such a coupling will be very innovative and promising to identify, to
measure and to explain the transformation of public administration. Last but not least, if other
countries (which are already members of the policy agenda project, like Belgium, Denmark,
the UK and the Netherlands) also proceed to such an empirical analysis, then a comparative
analysis of the links between policy punctuations and transformation of public administration
would be feasible.
4.2 "Europeanisation" of public administration: emergence of new IRAs
The liberalization of sectors that had previously been under monopoly control (e.g.,
telecommunications, railways, the postal service, electricity and gas) as well as the eventual
privatization of public corporations has significantly transformed the modes of delivering
public services. Switzerland is currently undergoing a shift from the “ownership State”, in
which the corporations were guarantors of the general interest and provided the goods and
services that met the needs of the collective users, to a “regulatory State”, which is limited to
monitoring the adherence to rules of competition and the sectoral regulations by the service
providers (both public and/or private) of the functions of the former public service. The re-
regulation that is required for the control of this “functional” form of public service implies a
number of explicit political choices, most importantly with respect to the range of goods and
services to maintain as public services, the assignment of service providers and the method of
financing.
In light of the past practices of the Federation, fundamental questions must be asked
regarding, on the one hand, the effects of the liberalization and privatization process and, on
the other hand, the modes of re-regulation, particularly with regard to the eventual
establishment of sector-specific independent regulatory authorities IRAs. Previous studies
have analyzed both the formal independence of IRAs (Gilardi 2006) as well as the real
independence of IRAs from elected politicians and from the regulees (Maggetti 2007). A
further systematic mapping of the regulatory powers, resources and internal organizations of
IRAs in Switzerland is anyway necessary. Thus, the next step could consist in integrating and
expanding the previous databases developed by Gilardi and Maggetti. This follow-up work
should include IRAs regulating network industries (e.g. telecommunications, railways, the
postal service, electricity and gas) as well as economic regulation (e.g. general competition,
financial and banking sectors) and social regulation (e.g. pharmaceuticals, food safety,
environment, etc.). Of course, comparative studies of Swiss IRAs and IRAs in other European
countries (including their role in European networks of IRAs) will also allow to identifying
and assessing the (net) impact of the European Union and other international organizations
(such as WTO) on Swiss IRAs in particular, and on administrative structures in general.
4.3 Judicialisation and courts' impact on public administration
Last but not least, we are currently working on administrative litigation through judicial
review in Switzerland. We are undertaking an empirical analysis at both the federal and the
cantonal levels. Our main goal is to analyze the actual use of judicial review of administrative
action by combining qualitative and quantitative methods.16
As a matter of fact, new procedures in the administration of justice at the federal level have
come into force as of 1 January 2007. This reform encompasses not only a significant
overhaul of the Swiss judicial system at the federal level, but also the constitutional
implementation of a general right of access to the courts. The practical effect of this reform
will mainly be seen in the field of administrative law.
Our project aims to provide key information on the extent and scope of appeals against
federal and cantonal administrations’ decisions by identifying the policy fields in which
judicial review of administrative action is, in practice, most sought, determining who the
typical plaintiffs are and assessing the level of success of the studied litigation. Additionally,
the research project focuses on the strategies of policy actors as well as on the impact that the
use of judicial administrative litigation has on the content of public policies and, on the
activity and structures of the administration.
Our methodological approach combines, in the first stage, a quantitative analysis of appeals
against federal and cantonal agencies’ decisions that will be completed, in a second stage, by
a more in-depth qualitative analysis, including case studies, in order to provide information on
the main groups of applicants and on the outcome of their cases.
The project will analyze the period covering the two years (2005, 2006) preceding the
implementation of the reform as well as the two years following it (2007, 2007). The year
2000 will serve as our “control” year.
The following judicial authorities with jurisdiction over administrative action will be
analyzed: the Federal Supreme Court, the former federal appeals commissions, the new
Federal Administrative Court, cantonal judicial authorities (proper courts and court-like
bodies). At the cantonal level a selection of two urban cantons (Zurich and Geneva), one
mixed canton (Bern) and two rural cantons (Jura and Glarus) has been made.
For the first stage of the study, we will collect data and analyze court’s decisions, followed by
the organization, analysis and interpretation of the collected information and the presentation
of our first findings. On the basis of these first results, three to five policy sectors showing
particularly interesting characteristics will be subjected to a more qualitative in-depth
analysis, through case studies and interviews with the actors.
At the end, we should be able to assess the impacts of courts decision on the practice (and
maybe on the structure of the federal and cantonal public administration).
5. Conclusions
The present paper had a rather modest and descriptive aim in that we wanted to show where
we have identified challenges to the systematic mapping of public administrations and in what
parts ongoing research may help filling identified gaps. In further conceptual work, we may
discuss in more depth how the challenge of new modes of governance and cooperative
government can be addressed by focusing on the transformation of state structures rather than
by adopting a static view.
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See Articles 6, 7 and 8 as well as the appendix of the Regulation of 25 November 1998 on the organization of the government
and administration (OLOGA, RS 172.010.1).
ii
See chapter 6 of the report of the Control Committee of the Council of States devoted to problems arising during the launching
of Swissmedic and the evaluation of the current situation (FF 2005 259) as well as the 13 September 2004 postulate of the
Control Committee on administrative management in the third circle (04.3441).
iii
The federal law of 20 March 1998 on the Swiss Federal Railways (LCFF, RS 742.31) transformed the former public corporation
into a private company, in which the federation is the sole shareholder.
iv
The corporation Swisscom SA was created by the federal law of 30 April 1997 on the structure of the federal
telecommunications corporation (LET, RS 784.11).
v
The federal law of 30 April 1997 on the structure of the federal postal corporation (LOP, RS 783.1) created Swiss Post as a
legally independent institution with its own legal identity.
vi
The federal law of 10 October 1997 on corporations providing weapons to the federation (LEAC, RS 934.21) authorized the
federation to create private law-based public companies or to invest in such companies in order to guarantee the availability of
resources needed by the armed forces.
vii
My own calculations, based on the State Accounts of 1995 (pp. 278–79), 2000 (p. 280) and 2004 (p. 291).
viii
Art. 43 al. 2 LOGA.
ix
For 2004, the services directly under a department consist only of the units within the central federal administration (not
including General Secretariats). The services from the decentralized federal administration, such as decision-making committees
and the various autonomous corporations and agencies are not included in the calculation.
x
The list of the federal administrative units contained in the OLOGA (RS 172.010.1; in July 2005) contains only 46 units of the
central administration (not including General Secretariats, decision-making commissions and autonomous enterprises). The
distribution of these 46 units across the federal departments is the following: 5 within DFA, 8 within DHA, 4 within DJP, 7




Articles 4 and 5 of the Ordonnance on the commissions of 3 June 1996 (RS 172.31).
xiii
Article 9 of the Ordonnance on the commissions.
xiv
The figure of 181 organizations identified by the Chancellery differs from the 195 indicated by the Federal Council in the
context of their renewal for the administrative period of 2004 to 2007. In addition, it is necessary to take into account those
organs which are created in another framework due to the limited duration of their mandates (FF 2004 1839).